Brand Name Jihad:
Virtual Organization in an Age of Extremism

Gregoire Phillips[*]

Retreat Edition, Summer 2018

Why do rebel groups engaged in conflicts thousands of miles away from one another join extremist networks that offer them little to no prospects of cooperation or substantial material benefit? Why do extremist leaders co-opt these groups when doing so potentially spreads thin desperately needed external support? This research agenda seeks to explain the logic of transnational extremist movements by introducing a novel theory of "brand name extremism." Much like their transnational advocacy foils, core extremist organizations co-opt syndicate groups through transnational networks to appeal to fringe audiences otherwise unwilling to take risks to invest in extremism without links to niche issues. On the other hand, syndicate group leaders use allegiance to a transnational extremist network to lock in support within their own organizations while also seeking to monopolize the extremist space in their local market for conflict. Together, these incentives to create and join a transnational extremist network provide the foundation for a common "brand name" that signals a broad-based issue agenda to potential followers and a costly, narrow commitment to a common set of ideological goals to potential competitors. In the projects that follow, I explore the causes and consequences of brand name extremism on the potential followers of extremist groups, the local conflict theatres of syndicate groups, and the perceptions of threat by common enemies.

I   Introduction

Nearly two decades following the September 11th attack on the Twin Towers in New York City, the rise and success of transnational extremist organizations remains one of the most pressing global security threats of our time. Once limited to clandestine basements and sympathetic living rooms in isolation from one another, today's extremists are capable of forging

---

[*]Department of Political Science, University of California San Diego

enduring bonds across borders without ever physically crossing them. Core organizations like the Global al-Qaeda and its breakaway competitor, the Islamic State, have succeeded in building parallel networks of syndicate groups – groups that existed alongside or prior to either organization before joining their networks – across dozens of states. This innovation has not been lost on Western media or its audiences; headlines sensationalizing the spread of transnational terrorism abound in the modern press. [1] Relying heavily on the evolution of ICT technology, both organizations have drawn upon an enormous amount of human and financial resources from online networks of supporters in a way that simply wasn't possible decades ago. It would be no exaggeration to conclude that the ICT revolution of the past thirty years has profoundly transformed the way that extremists survive and thrive.

However, while we have painfully come to recognize the consequences of these changes, we know precious little about why these transnational extremist organizations build vast networks of syndicated groups. This gap in our knowledge emerges from the puzzling relationship between the core and syndicate organizations: while both go to great lengths to advertise their association to their supporters – changing their names and releasing videos, statements, and edicts announcing their relationship with one another – there appear to be very few material gains to cooperation between them. Groups that pledge *bay'a* (allegiance) to the leaders of the Islamic State or the Global al-Qaeda network rarely go on to join their new-found sister organizations on the battlefield, do not share significant resources among one another, and, in most cases, never interact with the leaders to whom they swear fealty. [2] Furthermore, pledging allegiance to a group like the Islamic State subjects syndicate organizations to military intervention by a host of powerful Western states – substantially handicapping their domestic goals in their home conflict theatre.[3] The core leadership of

---

[1] For some choice reflections of this media coverage, see Zavadski (2014); Fadel (2014); Fueller et al. (2012).

[2] While we lack systematic empirical evidence of this phenomenon, policy makers, academics, and journalists have generally found a surprising lack of exchange between groups within these networks. See Smith (2002); Trinkunas and Giraldo (2007); Calabria (2015); Comas et al. (2015).

[3] Boko Haram, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan serve are exemplary of this trend. For more information on the decline of Boko Haram in particular, see Calabria (2015);Allen (2016); Onuaha (2018).

these transnational extremist groups seem to receive almost nothing tangible from their syndicates. Even beyond the lack of material exchange, extending their organization to far-away conflicts would appear to spread the flow of resources and attention of supporters of groups like the Islamic State thin – an inconvenient problem for a core organization fighting multiple state and non-state actors to defend territorial holdings in Syria and Iraq. Such transnational coalitions provide no direct benefits – and in fact, may pose significant risks – to both core and syndicate organizations. So why do leaders invest in these transnational networks at all? And how do these transnational networks benefit both the core organizations and the syndicate groups that join them?

This dissertation answers the questions posed above by developing a theory of brand name extremism. Transnational extremism is characterized by two inter-related networks: an organizational network of core and syndicate groups, and a platform network of potential supporters. Core organizations and syndicate groups face strong incentives to invest in a common "brand name" identity that helps them accomplish their goals - goals that are contingent on the participation of individuals in the platform network of potential extremist followers. Core organizations, which receive a significant portion of their resources from abroad, recruit heavily from outside their local or regional conflict, and conduct operations outside of their local conflict base, seek to invest in a transnational brand that appeals to external recruits and financial patrons interested in a broad range of conflicts and causes. Core organizations may also invest in a transnational brand to spread thin the resources of an intervening state power - forcing states like the United States to divert counter-extremism resources from hotbeds like Iraq and Syria to far away conflicts in Nigeria and the Philippines by projecting power and influence abroad. Syndicate groups and their leaders, which typically receive most of their resources from local sources, recruit primarily from their local or regional conflict zones, and do not conduct external operations, seek to invest in a transnational brand to signal ideological legitimacy to competing extremist groups, competing factions within their own group, and potential local and regional recruits

and supporters. Syndicate groups may also invest in a transnational brand to expand their arsenal of financiers and tactics - connecting them to a diasporic network of tactical knowledge and financial connections that could boost an organization's local appeal and success.

The effect of these transnational brands on the attitudes and behavior of enemy state leaders and constituents is likely to be profound. Enemy heads of state, perceiving the spread of a transnational threat across multiple conflict theatres, are likely to mobilize military aid and assets on the ground in a way that transforms previously localized conflicts. These leaders represent constituents that are also likely to be affected by the perceived threat of a "global" adversary. Constituents in enemy states may observe the co-optation of a syndicate group into a transnational extremist network and perceive the core organization as stronger when, in fact, the balance of power between extremists and their enemies has not substantially shifted. These same constituents may also internalize their fears of a global threat and direct them closer to home - displaying more fear and aggression toward immigrant communities from places to which an extremist network has spread.

In the next section, I summarize existing explanations of extremist networks and the rise of social media as a tool of social movements. I then outline a theory of brand name extremism, describing the dual organizational and platform networks and their incentives to invest in a common brand within an extremist network.

II   Extremist Networks and the Transnational Turn

In the last two decades, scholars have produced a robust literature on transnational extremism, terrorism, and networks of conflict. This development parallels innovations in the application of network methods to the advent of social media, and even the spread of terrorist organizations and violent conflict. In this section, I will draw from these literatures to establish the theoretical foundation of my project.

Transnational Extremism and Terrorism

Among the foremost scholarly developments of the post-September 11th world is a renewed interest in the study of extremist groups and terrorism. This literature can be divided into two parts: the logic of extremism and terrorism as strategy and tactic, and the organization of extremist organizations. Building on early rationalist conceptualizations of terrorism (Sandler et al., 1983), Robert Pape's account of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism as an effective tool of war underpins more than a decade of work on the underlying rationality of terrorism as a tactic (Pape, 2003;Pape, 2006). Scholars expanded on this framework, breaking down the strategic logic of terrorism as a tactic of war and evaluating its effect on enemy states, civilians, and competing groups. Kydd and Walter (2006) outline five strategies of terrorism - connecting terrorist tactics to extremist goals and building on previous work to provide a framework for evaluating the strategies and desired outcomes of strategies of terror[4] Ethan Bueno de Mesquita's work on the interdependent effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism polices informs our understanding of how government efforts to fight terror – often initiated by extremist organizations – might benefit terrorists via negative civilian externalities (Bueno de Mesquita (2005); Bueno de Mesquita (2005); Bueno De Mesquita (2005)). Abrahms and Potter (2015) connect organizational structure to tactics in explaining how leadership deficits within an extremist organization can lead to more civilian targeting with terrorist tactics. Finally, Sann and Wood (2014) and Walter (2017) provide a foundation for the understanding of ideology as an integral, perhaps even strategic, tool of civil war among extremist groups. Altogether, this research motivates the strategic logic of extremist organizations and the tactics they bring to bear in conflict.

Building alongside this strategic logic, a second trend of scholarship emerged outlining the organizational features of transnational extremist organizations. Leading this charge, Bergen (2001) describes a corporate model of Al-Qaeda's organizational structure, while Asal et al. (2007) explore the organizational similarity between Al-Qaeda and transnational advocacy organizations like Advocacy International - applying constructivist principles of

---

[4]See also Kydd and Walter (2002).

advocacy organization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Carpenter, 2011) to the organization of jihad. Connecting these organizational insights to conflict outcomes, Asal and coauthors assess how the organizational composition of extremist groups that practice terror affects outcomes such as the selection of weapons and the lethality of terrorist attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Asal et al., 2012). Abdukadirov (2010) explores how social, rather than material, incentives motivate recruits to join terrorist organizations before conceptualizing how this might affect the organization of extremist groups. Speaking to both the social and material incentives operating within an extremist organization, Berman (2011) shows how a leader's ability to sanction followers allows groups to leverage radical violence to accomplish their goals, while Shapiro (2015) leverages agency theory to explain how variation in the ability to monitor and sanction members in-group produces variation in the hierarchy of extremist organizations.

This literature establishes a firm foundation for an understanding of the logic of terrorism, its use by extremist organizations, and the internal dynamics of groups that employ terrorist tactics. However, this literature does little to address the increasingly transnational nature of extremist organization in the twenty first century. Furthermore, this literature fails to adequately explain the incentives that drive extremist groups to seek a reputation across borders. In this dissertation, I will bridge this organizational literature with an understanding of how the relationship between groups within a transnational network affects outcomes among followers and enemies alike.

Networks, Social Media, and Extremism

Perhaps nowhere has the literature advanced so quickly as in the study of networks and social media. Two developments in the study of network behavior and information are relevant to this dissertation: the diffusion of information in extremist networks, and the behavior of individuals on social media networks.

Most important to the conceptualization of transnational extremist organizations as networks is the mechanism that links individuals and organizations together. A number of

scholars have established the use of network methods as both a conceptual and methodological framework and tool (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Diani et al., 2003; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009) . Diani et al. (2003) includes terrorist networks as an example of social movements within a framework of contention and protest, while Comas et al. (2015) conceptualize terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda as polymorphic entities - existing simultaneously as formal organizations, networks of interlinked groups, and movements of extremist followers with aligned preferences for social and political change. Beyond this conceptualization and methodological description, a number of scholars have applied the framework of social networks to the study of protest and collective action behavior on social media services like Twitter. Burns and Eltham (2009) and Rahimi (2011) provide compelling accounts of the use of Twitter and the adaptation of the Iranian government to cyber contestation. Steinert-Threlkeld (2017) uses Twitter to show that protesters in Egypt and other Arab Spring social movements succeeded at initiating collective action in social movements without consistent access to social media and without being particularly well-connected. Mitts (2018) uses Twitter data to show how the rise of anti-Muslim political movements in Europe leads to increased radicalization among Muslims in districts where these movements perform well in elections. Phillips et al. (W.P.) match Twitter data from Islamic State supporters to publicly available Islamic State propaganda to show how radicalization outcomes are influenced by qualitatively different propaganda appeals.

This emerging literature highlights the promise of networks as both conceptual and methodological tools in the study of extremism and online social movements. In this dissertation, I carry forward these tools to construct a better understanding of the relationship between organizations and supporters in transnational extremist movements.

III Brand Name Extremism

At the center of the theory of brand name extremism is the concept of two inter-related networks: an organizational network comprised of a core and syndicate groups, and a platform network of potential supporters. In what follows, I describe this dual network before breaking down the incentives for both core and syndicate to invest in a common brand name.

The Organizational Network

Within the organizational network, a core organization comprised of the central leadership of the transnational organization co-opts smaller groups engaged in peripheral conflicts into their "syndicated" network. These two organizations are distinguished by several distinct features.

Core organizations of a transnational extremist network (henceforth TEN and TENs) typically share three features. First, the core organization typically comprises the leadership of the TEN. Within this core, members of the central leadership of a network typically share a common allegiance to an extremist ideology and coordinate to accomplish shared organizational goals. Second, the core organization typically seeks to control the division and concentration of financial resources and recruits that join the organization. As I will show in the case analysis, the leadership of core organizations operate strategically to accomplish specific goals within their ideological platform, often devoting resources strategically to a limited, focused subset of organizational initiatives at a time. Third, while the core organization relies substantially on local material support and recruits, they also invest heavily in soliciting support from external sympathizers far removed from their local battlefield. They do so for two reasons. First, core organizations typically receive substantial funding from external donors. This is one way in which core organizations distinguish themselves from syndicate groups; core organizations typically build and rely upon external patrons, and these external patrons usually exert significant influence in the organization's activities. Second, core organizations also distinguish themselves from syndicate groups by pursuing transnational goals away from their local conflicts of interest that require the recruitment

of supporters in faraway places. Altogether, these three features serve as the distinguishing characteristics of a core organization – allowing me to separate and describe cores as distinct from syndicate groups.

Syndicate groups may differ geographically, linguistically, ethnically, and even religiously across the network, but they typically share four features. First, syndicate groups tend to share the same extremist ideological leaning as the TEN they join. This feature serves as a scope condition for potential members of a network – limiting the universe of possible groups to co-opt to those with a similar ideological identity. Second, the emergence of syndicate groups tends to precede their participation in a TEN. In other words, syndicate organizations typically emerge and participate within their local conflict theatres before opting into a TEN. Third, syndicate groups tend to rely on local networks of support and recruitment prior to their participation in a TEN. Fourth, this reliance on local networks of support and recruitment does not typically change when a syndicate group joins a TEN; syndicate groups that opt into a TEN continue to draw most of their financial, material, and personnel support primarily from local sources even after plugging into a broader network.

Table 1: Distinguishing Core and Syndicate Organizations

Feature	Core	Syndicate
Receive a significant portion of resources from abroad?	Yes	No
Recruit outside their local or regional conflict	Yes	No
Conduct external operations?	Yes	No

The Platform Network

The platform network of a transnational extremist organization is composed of two groups: the local network and the external network. The local network is comprised of all recruits and supporters that join or participate in an extremist organization – core or syndicate – within their local conflict theatre. The external network is comprised of all recruits and supporters that join or participate in an extremist organization from outside

of their local conflict theatre. These two groups differ most importantly in two ways: the way that they access information about the extremist organization(s) that they support, and the barriers they face in supporting or joining the extremist cause. Local recruits and supporters access most of their information about extremist organizations through word of mouth or in print, and, all else equal, typically face lower barriers to support relative to their external counterparts. External recruits and supporters in an Internet age access most of their information about extremist organizations virtually – either through private communications or social media – and, all else equal, typically face higher barriers to support relative to their local counterparts.

Local recruits and supporters are characterized by geographic proximity to the extremist organization and potential pre-existing social ties to extremists. This geographic and social proximity facilitates interactions between them and existing extremist organization members and sympathizers, which can serve as the primary vector of radicalizing information and influence. However, in most cases, joining or supporting an extremist cause is risky business – potential members risk punishment by the state, alienation from more moderate friends and family, and death at the hands of competing extremist groups. Local recruits and supporters may also encounter multiple, competing extremist organizations to which they might be sympathetic, further complicating their decision to opt into an extremist movement.

External recruits and supporters are characterized by geographic distance from the extremist organization. This geographic and social distance means that external supporters must usually turn to the internet to access information and interact with existing extremist organization members and sympathizers. Thus, the internet serves as the primary vector of radicalizing information and influence for most external recruits and followers of extremist organizations. External supporters face particularly high costs to joining an extremist cause. If discovered, they may be designated as terrorists and prosecuted under state law. External supporters might also face social sanctions from more moderate members of their friend or familial in-group. In addition to the costs posed by potential state and community

sanctioning, external recruits and supporters face the cost of travel and emigration to join the organization in their local conflict theatre, or the costs imposed by the risk of capture or punishment in carrying out an attack in their home state. These additional costs and risk push the relative costs of external support higher than those of local support, all else equal.

Core Organization Incentives

Core organizations face two unique tradeoffs in accomplishing their goals in conflict. First, while they are able to distinguish themselves clearly from competing moderate groups through an extremist ideology, extremists face barriers to recruiting locally that push them to focus their efforts on the fringe of social groups near and abroad. Put another way, extremist groups have a comparative advantage in developing a clear signal based on their fringe ideological goals, but typically operate in combat theatres containing few willing to join their cause against more moderate alternatives. The advent of online focal points like Twitter and other social media forums has created a larger market for extremist networks to sell their brand. But this larger market requires extremist groups to attract and retain supporters on venues characterized by passive attention and armchair activism, while also convincing far away supporters that participating in the extremist cause and accomplishing the proximate goals of the core organization will benefit them in a tangible way.

Second, extremist organizations that gain a transnational following risk attracting the attention of powerful external state actors. These states can bring significant military and financial assets to bear on extremist groups – providing weapons to the governments fighting them on the ground, deploying their own forces to eradicate perceived extremist threats, and investing in counter-extremism measures targeting external financing and recruitment. While extremist organizations might leverage their overseas following in ways that are intended to provoke powerful states to join a local conflict (Kydd and Walter, 2006), escalation by militarily strong adversaries can threaten the survival of extremist organizations and significantly hinder their ability to accomplish their goals. As intervening powers sap the resources of core organizations and threaten their ability to accomplish their local goals,

extremist leaders face escalating pressures to redirect the flames.

In order to succeed in this environment, I propose that extremist organizations develop "brand names" that tie their core organizational goals to a broader agenda more likely to attract and retain the attention of a larger pool of potential recruits and supporters. These brand names accomplish two goals for the core organization. First, through large and sophisticated propaganda machines that distribute a wide variety of videos, magazines, music, and news releases on the internet, extremist organizations that "go transnational" advertise to a global audience sympathetic to the groups ideological principles and their diverse global outcomes. While these mediums provide a large potential market of supporters, extremist organizations must brand themselves in a way that captures the interest of extremist sympathizers with niche interests in particular conflicts. The inclusion of organizations in distant conflict theatres allows core extremist groups to pull off a virtual coup d'œil: they can advertise greater influence across a greater number of conflicts that potential supporters might care about without actually participating in those conflicts in any significant way. A Bangladeshi immigrant with extremist leanings may be sympathetic to the Islamic States cause in Syria and Iraq but may not be willing to risk supporting the organization unless they also perceive IS to be active in Bangladesh; an Uzbek immigrant sympathetic to anti-Western extremism might like what self-proclaimed IS khalif Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has to say but may be hesitant to participate in an attack unless they are convinced that IS will change the status quo outside of the Middle East. This effect extends beyond ethno-nationalist interests; I argue that the perception of global reach and involvement itself attracts more followers and increases the participation of these followers within the organization. In this dissertation, I will show that the addition of syndicates in peripheral conflict broadens the appeal of TENs by tying their ideological cause to a larger forum of conflicts, thereby compelling some otherwise sympathetic potential supporters to commit to investing in a transnational brand of extremism when they otherwise might not have.

Second, these brand names allow extremist organizations to project power with rela-

tively little material investment – encouraging intervening forces to expend their military assets across a wider set of conflicts. This diversionary tactic decreases the military pressure on the core organization and increases their odds of survival in the face of a powerful intervening state challenger. However, the success of this diversionary tactic is contingent on a credible signal that the threat posed by the core organization is linked to the threat posed by the syndicate group. The adoption of a common brand name sends this signal in two ways. First, it links the success of the syndicate group to the success of the core organization through the shared TEN brand name. Second, it serves as a commitment mechanism to extremism by the syndicate group, which assumes the potential costs of military intervention and escalation by joining a TEN. In this dissertation, I will show that the addition of syndicates in peripheral conflicts corresponds to changes in the distribution of military aid and intervening deployments by states fighting the extremist organization. I will also test the constituency mechanism directly through a survey design – a mechanism I describe in more detail below.

From these incentives, I derive two testable hypotheses:

> **H1:** The addition of a syndicates group to a TEN will correspond to an increase in followers in the external platform network.
>
> **H2:** The addition of a syndicate group to a TEN will correspond to an increase of military aid and deployment by states fighting the core extremist organization.

Syndicate Group Incentives

While this issue capture mechanism explains why leaders of the core organization might have incentive to co-opt syndicates in far-away conflicts, it does not explain why syndicates have an incentive to join. As described above, there are several reasons to believe that doing so endangers extremist groups by inviting Western militaries to donate resources or personnel to their eradication. Why do syndicates risk potential eradication to join a TEN?

Syndicate group leaders might join a TEN to compete both horizontally, across organi-

zations, and vertically, within their own organization. First, joining an organization like IS or al-Qaeda serves as a costly signal of ideological purity to potential followers and potential competitors in their local conflict theatre. Leaders that pledge allegiance to a TEN tie their groups ideological brand to that of the greater organizational network to signal to potential regional recruits or competitor organizations that they will carry out their extremist agenda – a signal that is made costly by the potential for conflict by intervening forces like the United States or European allies. Second, joining a TEN allows embattled leaders of syndicate groups to tie their leadership to the transnational cause – making their continued leadership a referendum on the shared extremist commitment between the syndicate and the core. Embattled leaders use recognition from the leaders of organizations like IS or al-Qaeda to shore up factional support among those aligned with transnational ideological commitments while suppressing competitors who cannot remove the leader from power without endangering the groups association with the larger network. In some cases, this results in what I call "competitive extremism," wherein competing factions in a syndicate extremist group pledge allegiance to competing transnational organizations.

Syndicate group leaders might also join a TEN to expand their arsenal of financiers and tactics. There are two reasons why joining a TEN could do so. First, joining a TEN connects otherwise peripheral extremist groups to a diaspora of extremist financiers. While this financing is unlikely to be consistent or turn the tides of the local conflict, funding or supplies from these financiers serves two functions. It provides syndicate groups with a boost that increases their appeal among local or regional supporters. It also allows the leaders of these groups to tie combat effectiveness and survival to their leadership through connection to the extremist brand. Second, joining a TEN provides both the embedded moral authority and advanced tactical knowledge necessary to carry out negotiated kidnappings, suicide attacks, and bombings more frequently and effectively. Core organizations with an established ideological base of authority give syndicate leaders a powerful tool to motivate their followers to carry out operations that they might otherwise be unwilling to participate in.

TENs also provide syndicate leaders access to corpus of tactical knowledge, strategic insight, and tactical training that can be easily transmitted and facilitated online from thousands of miles away.

From these incentives, I derive three testable hypotheses:

H3: Syndicate leaders will be more likely to join a TEN when they face local or regional competition from competing extremist groups.

H4: Syndicate leaders will be more likely to join a TEN when they face internal competition from within their own organization.

H5: Joining a TEN will correspond to a change in the range and success of tactics employed by syndicate groups (need to identify concrete, theoretically informed list of tactics to which this applies).

Figure 1: Core-Syndicate Relationship

Perception of Global Threat

The above argument provides the preconditions for TEN to be beneficial to both core and syndicate. But how does a TEN's structure affect potential adversaries of the greater organization? And what is the mechanism through which a perception of global threat mobilizes the constituencies of enemy states to take action against a transnational extremist network? In other words, what are the effects of adding syndicate organizations to a transnational extremist network on their enemies perception of an organizations strength or resolve?

I argue that perceptions of transnationalism – communicated through joint propaganda under a common brand name – make organizations like IS or al-Qaeda appear more threatening to the constituents of their state opponents. Uninformed citizens grasping for cues about extremist organizations latch onto the globalist brand of transnational extremist groups and infer combined military strength and coordination where it doesnt actually exist. This allows groups like the Islamic State to project power through perceptions of an encompassing threat among enemy constituencies. Furthermore, this perception of strength creates a counter-intuitive gauge of extremist success. Since core organizations are most likely to advertise and emphasize the operations of their syndicate groups when they are least successful in their core territories, enemy constituencies are actually most likely to perceive core organizations like the Islamic State as gaining strength when they may in fact be losing it. In this dissertation, I will show that the projection of power behind the transnational extremist brand name alone affects perceptions of strength in low-information environments. I will also show how these perceptions motivate increasing tensions between Western domestic audiences and Islamic immigrants in a way that further plays into the strategies of extremist organizations.

From this perception of threat, I derive two testable hypotheses:

H6: Individuals in "enemy states" of TENs are more likely to perceive a core organization as gaining strength when informed a syndicate group's membership in the TEN.

H7: Individuals in "enemy states" of TENs are more likely to perceive

a core organization as gaining strength when informed of a syndicate
group's membership in the TEN even when presented with information
suggesting the organization's military defeat.

H8: Individuals in "enemy states" of TENs are more likely to reflect
aggressive or fearful attitudes toward individuals from a country in
which a syndicate group is active if primed by a syndicate group's
presence in that country.

References

Sherzod Abdukadirov. Terrorism: The Dark Side of Social Entrepreneurship. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(7):603–617, June 2010. ISSN 1057-610X. doi: 10.1080/1057610X. 2010.484011. URL `https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.484011`.

Max Abrahms and Philip B. K. Potter. Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics. *International Organization*, 69(2):311–342, 2015. ISSN 0020-8183, 1531-5088. doi: 10.1017/S0020818314000411. URL `https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/explaining-terrorism-leadership-deficits-and-militant-group-tactics/56586030B4F2EBDFBAB6345D69101036`.

Nathaniel Allen. Charting Boko Haram's Rapid Decline, September 2016. URL `https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/charting-boko-harams-rapid-decline/`.

Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer. The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(2):437–449, April 2008. ISSN 0022-3816. doi: 10.1017/S0022381608080419. URL `https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381608080419`.

Victor Asal, Brian Nussbaum, and D. William Harrington. Terrorism as Transnational

Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(1):15–39, January 2007. ISSN 1057-610X, 1521-0731. doi: 10.1080/10576100600959713. URL `https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10576100600959713`.

Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35(3):229–254, March 2012. ISSN 1057-610X. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2012. 648156. URL `https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.648156`.

Peter L. Bergen. *Holy war, Inc: inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden.* Free Press, New York, 2001. ISBN 978-0-7432-0502-3.

Eli Berman. *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism.* The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., reprint edition edition, September 2011. ISBN 978-0-262-51667-9.

Stephen P. Borgatti and Pacey C. Foster. The Network Paradigm in Organizational Research: A Review and Typology. *Journal of Management*, 29(6):991–1013, December 2003. ISSN 0149-2063. doi: 10.1016/S0149-2063(03)00087-4. URL `http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149206303000874`.

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. *International Organization*, 59(1):145–176, January 2005. ISSN 1531-5088, 0020-8183. doi: 10.1017/S0020818305050022. URL `https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/conciliation-counterterrorism-and-patterns-of-terrorist-violence/93A967067EEA348F8641DFEE966F6DDA`.

Ethan Bueno De Mesquita. The Quality of Terror. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3):515–530, July 2005. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00139.x. URL `https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00139.x`.

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. The Terrorist Endgame: A Model with Moral Hazard and
Learning. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2):237–258, April 2005. ISSN 0022-0027,
1552-8766. doi: 10.1177/0022002704272193. URL `http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/`
`10.1177/0022002704272193`.

Alex Burns and Ben Eltham. Twitter Free Iran: an Evaluation of Twitter's Role in Public
Diplomacy and Information Operations in Iran's 2009 Election Crisis. pages 322–334,
University of Technology, Sydney, November 2009. URL `http://networkinsight.org/`
`verve/_resources/Burns_Eltham_file.pdf`.

Stephen Calabria. Foreign fighters flock to IS, but not to Boko Haram
| DW | 20.02.2015, February 2015. URL `http://www.dw.com/en/`
`foreign-fighters-flock-to-is-but-not-to-boko-haram/a-18268533`.

R. Charli Carpenter. Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Para-
dox of Weapons Norms. *International Organization*, 65(01):69–102, January 2011. ISSN
1531-5088. doi: 10.1017/S0020818310000329. URL `http://journals.cambridge.org/`
`article_S0020818310000329`.

Jordi Comas, Paul Shrivastava, and Eric C. Martin. Terrorism as Formal Organization,
Network, and Social Movement. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 24(1):47–60, January
2015. ISSN 1056-4926. doi: 10.1177/1056492614538486. URL `https://doi.org/10.`
`1177/1056492614538486`.

Mario Diani, Doug McAdam, and Professor of Sociology Doug McAdam. *Social Movements
and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*. Oxford University Press, 2003.
ISBN 978-0-19-925177-3. Google-Books-ID: jurnCwAAQBAJ.

Leila Fadel. With Cash And Cachet, The Islamic State Expands Its Empire, March
2014. URL `https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/18/364942091/`
`with-cash-and-cachet-the-islamic-state-expands-its-empire`.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization*, 52(04):887–917, September 1998. ISSN 1531-5088. doi: 10.1162/002081898550789. URL `http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0020818398440608`.

J. Fueller, R. Schroll, S. Dennhardt, and K. Hutter. Social Brand Value and the Value Enhancing Role of Social Media Relationships for Brands. In *2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, pages 3218–3227, January 2012. doi: 10.1109/HICSS.2012.533.

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery. Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization*, 63(3):559–592, July 2009. ISSN 1531-5088, 0020-8183. doi: 10.1017/S0020818309090195. URL `https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/network-analysis-for-international-relations/DE2910979C1B5C44C4CC13F336C5DE97`.

Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence. *International Organization*, 56(2):263–296, 2002. ISSN 1531-5088, 0020-8183. doi: 10.1162/002081802320005487. URL `https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/sabotaging-the-peace-the-politics-of-extremist-violence/666AF3ED0F89A36B21DBBF61A54C862F`.

Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. The Strategies of Terrorism. *International Security*, 31(1):49–80, 2006. ISSN 0162-2889. URL `http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137539`.

Tamar Mitts. From Isolation to Radicalization: Anti-Muslim Hostility and Support for ISIS in the West. *R&R at American Political Science Review*, 2018.

Freedom Onuaha. Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group

in Nigeria, April 2018. URL `http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/` `anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.` `html`.

Robert Pape. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, reprint edition edition, July 2006. ISBN 978-0-8129-7338-9.

Robert A. Pape. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American political science review*, 97(3):343–361, 2003.

Gregoire Phillips, Barbara F Walter, and Tamar Mitts. Extremist Radicalization and Recruitment in an Internet Age.

Babak Rahimi. The Agonistic Social Media: Cyberspace in the Formation of Dissent and Consolidation of State Power in Postelection Iran. *The Communication Review*, 14(3): 158–178, July 2011. ISSN 1071-4421. doi: 10.1080/10714421.2011.597240. URL `https:` `//doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2011.597240`.

Todd Sandler, John T. Tschirhart, and Jon Cauley. A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 77(1):36–54, March 1983. ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943. doi: 10.2307/1956010. URL `https:` `//www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/` `article/theoretical-analysis-of-transnational-terrorism/` `6852F0735B870BE608F9A71ACC12EBD8`.

Francisco Gutirrez Sann and Elisabeth Jean Wood. Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(2):213–226, March 2014. ISSN 0022-3433, 1460-3578. doi: 10.1177/0022343313514073. URL `http://journals.sagepub.com/` `doi/10.1177/0022343313514073`.

Jacob Shapiro. *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*. Princeton

University Press, Princeton; Oxford, reprint edition edition, July 2015. ISBN 978-0-691-16630-8.

Paul Smith. Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities. *Parameters*, 2002. URL `https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/02summer/smith.htm`.

Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld. Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the Arab Spring. *American Political Science Review*, 111(2):379–403, May 2017. ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943. doi: 10.1017/S0003055416000769. URL `https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/spontaneous-collective-action-peripheral-mobilization-during-the-arab-spring/2E9A10C26CA53918CCAD479E6F7E4646#fndtn-information`.

Harold A. Trinkunas and Jeanne K. Giraldo, editors. *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1 edition edition, March 2007. ISBN 978-0-8047-5566-5.

Barbara F. Walter. The Extremist's Advantage in Civil Wars. *International Security*, 42 (2):7–39, November 2017. ISSN 0162-2889, 1531-4804. doi: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00292. URL `http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00292`.

Katie Zavadski. ISIS Now Has a Network of Military Affiliates in 11 Countries Around the World, 2014. URL `http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/11/isis-now-has-military-allies-in-11-countries.html`.